Fang教授提出了一个新的假设,即中国最近的反腐运动可能促成了最近中国国有企业( SOEs )的复苏,这是一个意外的结果。文章通过提供中国房地产行业的支持性证据,探讨反腐运动与国有企业复苏之间的关系,该行业因普遍存在寻租和腐败而臭名昭著。
文章使用一套独特的地块交易数据,并结合公司层面的注册信息和difference-in-differences实证设计表明,相对于作为控制的工业用地,反腐败运动后,国有企业购买的住宅用地比例相对于私人开发商购买的比例显著增加。这一发现是稳健的一组替代规格。Fang教授等通过一个模型的镜头来解释这些发现,因为向私人开发商出售土地带有城市官员可能收受贿赂的刻板印象,即使是“清廉”的地方官员也会更愿意将土地出让给国有企业,尽管存在效率更高的私人开发商,最终发现了与模型预测相一致的证据。
下周三( 4 月 27 日),Hanming Fang教授(宾夕法尼亚大学)将发表他的工作论文“理解中国国有企业的复苏:来自房地产行业的证据”,作为核心中国在线研讨会的一部分。本文与Jing Wu, Rongjie Zhang, 以及Li-An Zhou合著。
时间:4月27日 (周三)20:00
在线地址:报名后告知
主办方:西班牙纳瓦拉大学经济商业学院中国研究中心(Core China research center, School of Economics and Business, University of Navarra)
Abstract:
We advance a novel hypothesis that China’s recent anti-corruption campaign may have contributed to the recent resurgence of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China as an unintended consequence. We explore the nexus between the anti-corruption campaign and the SOE resurgence by presenting supporting evidence from the Chinese real estate sector, which is notorious for pervasive rent-seeking and corruption. We use a unique data set of land parcel transactions merged with firm-level registration information and a difference-in-differences empirical design to show that, relative to the industrial land parcels which serve as the control, the fraction of residential land parcels purchased by SOEs increased significantly relative to that purchased by private developers after the anti-corruption campaign. This finding is robust to a set of alternative specifications. We interpret the findings through the lens of a model where we show, since selling land to private developers carries the stereotype that the city official may have received bribes, even the “clean” local officials will become more willing to award land to SOEs despite the presence of more efficient competing private developers. We find evidence consistent with the model predictions.